Showing posts with label Beginners. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Beginners. Show all posts

Wednesday, 17 August 2011

Selecting a New Motherboard: A Beginner's Guide


Are you looking for a new motherboard? With so many models available, deciding which to buy can be difficult. However, if you use this checklist, considering each motherboard feature, you should be able to find one that's right for you.

1. Socket type: What socket type does your CPU require? A 775 for Intel Pentiums? Perhaps a 939 AMD. Start to narrow your selection with this most basic criteria, matching motherboard socket to CPU.

2. Form factor: The board has to fit your case. The size of the board is its "form factor". An ATX form factor case will accept 12x9.6 inch boards. But a microATX requires boards no larger than 9.6x9.6. Please note that any of the smaller boards can be mounted in an ATX case.

3. RAM: You'll probably buy a board that uses PC3200 RAM. But be aware that some older boards still on the market call themselves "PC3200 capable" but can only use it in up to two banks. Also, some boards only have two slots, rather than the more common number of three. If you need to run 3 GB of RAM, for extreme game play, you'll need a three-slot board.

4. Front Speed Bus: It's an oversimplification to say this number is the speed information passes through your motherboard, but it's a good enough definition for our purposes. Faster is better, but keep in mind that speed is money, if you're on a budget. The tops on AMD based systems is a whopping 2000MHz.

5. Video and sound on the motherboard: Do you want these two items built into the board, or would you rather buy cards and plug them in? Video on the motherboard is usually adequate, unless you're a gamer. In that case you'll want to forgo it in favor of the next feature.

6. AGP port: Gamers, video editors, 3-D animators, all want the best graphics card they can get, so they require an Accelerated Graphics Port. Most all boards have them, but make sure they will handle 8X or better speed, if you've got your heart set on a really fast card.

7. PCI slots: How many slots will you need for things like modems, capture cards, and the like? Some of the microATX boards come with only two, which may be inadequate. I favor boards with 4 or more slots, giving plenty of expansion capability.

8. Firewire: If you shoot and edit video, 1394 IEEE, otherwise known as firewire, is a necessity. If a board you're considering doesn't have it, figure on using one of your PCI slots for a card.

After you've gone through these eight items, you should be well on the way to making your selection.




Michael Quarles is the author of Building a PC for Beginners.





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Thursday, 23 June 2011

Health Care Rationing for Beginners

By James Kwak


“Obama-care kills Medicare as we know it. Obama-care raids $500 billion from Medicare to spend on Obama-care, puts in place a 15-panel board to ration Medicare by unelected bureaucrats.


“Our budget, repeals the raiding, gets rid of the rationing board, preserves this program, makes no changes for a person 55 years of age or older and saves Medicare, by reforming it for our generation, so it’s solvent. The president’s plan does not save Medicare, it allows it to go bankrupt, rations the program and raids the program. We get rid of the rationing, we stop the raiding and we save the program from bankruptcy.”


That was Paul Ryan on Fox News recently.


Ordinarily this wouldn’t be worth responding to, except to point out, as Sam Stein did, that Ryan’s proposed budget also ”raids $500 billion from Medicare,” so the statement that “we stop the raiding” is, um, a lie. But it isn’t news that Paul Ryan has an issue with honesty, except perhaps for David Brooks.


But there’s a theme that is surfacing that goes something like this: OK, Ryan’s plan is extreme and has no chance. But we all know we spend too much on health care, and we have to spend less, which means that we have to ration care one way or another. Ryan does it by scrapping Medicare in favor of indexed vouchers; Obama does it by reducing Medicare payment rates and, more ominously, with “a 15-panel board to ration Medicare by unelected bureaucrats.”


On one level this seems true. We are projected to spend too much on health care, and we need to reduce those projections. And in one sense, we can call that “rationing.” As you learn in Economics 101, economics is about the allocation of scarce goods and primarily about using markets to allocate scarce goods. If you define rationing as the allocation of scarce goods (where everyone can’t get everything she wants), then obviously we have to ration health care. But just as obviously, we ration it already: we ration health care by denying most of it (except emergency care) to poor people, people without good jobs, people with preexisting conditions, and so on. So the statement that we have to ration care is unexceptional to the point of being meaningless.


But let’s move on to the issue of “we have to spend less on health care.” I’m going to get to the Affordable Care Act (“Obama-care”) and the Ryan budget, but first we need to take a detour through free market fantasy land.


The question is, if we accept the principle that markets are generally the best way to allocate scarce resources, how should this work for health care? The theoretical answer is pretty simple. People who buy health insurance (mainly employers, but also individuals) want decent health care at a reasonable price. They shop among health insurers. Health insurers compete by figuring out how to offer better health care at lower prices. A traditional indemnity plan, where the insurer pays for 80 percent of whatever the provider charges for anything the insured wants, is a lousy way to compete: you end up with not-so-good outcomes at extremely high prices. That’s why most of the private health insurance market today is HMOs (access to procedures is controlled) and especially PPOs (negotiated prices with select providers, low payments to out-of-network providers). In theory, insurers should be figuring out how to get the best health outcomes at the lowest possible price. To do that, they should be figuring out what procedures are most likely to lead to good outcomes and setting payment schedules to motivate patients and doctors to select those procedures; they should also be figuring out what procedures are a waste of money and motivating patients and doctors to avoid those. They motivate patients and doctors by setting low payment rates for worthless procedures or simply refusing to pay for them. That will scare away some health insurance buyers, but in the long run, the good insurers will have better outcomes at lower prices, and they will attract customers on that basis.


Of course, this is all in free market fantasy land. The private health insurance market does not work that way; if it did, we wouldn’t have a health care cost crisis in this country. Why it doesn’t work that way is a subject of much debate. It could be because providers have too much market power relative to insurers; it could be because the main buyers of health insurance (employers) don’t actually care about outcomes, just about offering a decent-looking plan at the lowest possible cost.* But the key point is that competition is supposed to be driving insurers to become more efficient: creating health plans that produce better outcomes and lower costs.


Is this rationing? Yes, in the uninteresting sense that people do not have unlimited access to health care for free. But is it rationing in the commonly understood sense of “something bad where someone unfairly decides you can’t have something you need”? No, almost by definition: when markets allocate scarce resources, we generally don’t call that rationing.**


Now, back to reality. What is that “15-panel board to ration Medicare by unelected bureaucrats” that Ryan is talking about? It’s the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), which was created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). IPAB is charged with coming up with plans to reduce the growth rate of Medicare spending without restricting benefits or eligibility. One way IPAB is expected to do this is by analyzing the various pilot programs for new ways of delivering or paying for health care established by the ACA. Using evidence, IPAB should be able to change the way Medicare pays for services to affect provider incentives in ways that provide better outcomes at lower costs — or, at least, ensure lower costs with minimal adverse affects to outcomes. Importantly, IPAB’s recommendations become binding unless overridden by a supermajority in Congress, making it more likely that cost-saving measures will actually become law.


Does this sound familiar? It’s exactly what private-sector health insurers should be doing (four paragraphs up), but aren’t. It’s using research and analysis to make Medicare a more efficient health insurance plan, one that spends less money while maintaining outcomes for participants. Is it rationing? It’s only rationing to the extent that the pursuit of efficiency is rationing. You can call it rationing if you want, but then you have to concede that rationing is exactly what all health insurance companies do, even though they’re not doing it very well at the moment.


If IPAB is just supposed to do what private sector insurers are supposed to do, why are Republicans in such a tizzy over it? One reason is simply that the Obama administration is for it, so they’re against it; another is that they will try to spin anything they can as “Democrats slashing Medicare,” for obvious political reasons. But there is a more fundamental reason.


Republicans like Paul Ryan don’t want Medicare to become more efficient because they want the program to fail. Medicare is a very popular program in its current form; as Jonathan Oberlander details in The Political Life of Medicare, it has always been a popular program with the public. The only way to eliminate Medicare is to convince the public that it is causing some other, huge problem — namely, the national debt. So this leaves people like Paul Ryan in the position of rooting for the Medicare budget gap to be as big as possible and trying to shoot down anything that can actually close the gap. (On the left, I believe this is known as a Trotskyist position — intensifying the contradictions of Medicare. Even if the problem with Medicare is its budget deficit, Paul Ryan and his fellow travelers oppose measures that reduce the deficit because they also reduce the chances of the Revolution.)


What about Ryan’s claim that his proposal “saves Medicare, by reforming it for our generation, so it’s solvent”? As everyone knows by now, the Ryan Plan replaces current Medicare with a voucher program, where seniors get a voucher to use to by health insurance in the private market; the vouchers are set to grow in value considerably slower than GDP, let alone health care costs. This is not Medicare.


Right now, Medicare actually provides two kinds of insurance. First, it is a health insurance plan, which means that once you are a beneficiary it will pay for a lot of your health care expenses. Second, it insures you against not being able to buy health insurance. If you are over 65, it insures you against being dropped by your insurer because you get sick; more importantly (since that is already accomplished by regulation), if you are under 65, it insures that you will be able to get decent (though not particularly good) health insurance when you are 65. Without Medicare, not only would you not have that guarantee (unless you work for one of a small and declining number of employers), but you would not be able to buy that guarantee for any price.


Under the Ryan Plan, both of these kinds of insurance go away. What’s left? A forced saving and redistribution program, where you pay Medicare payroll taxes while you work, and once you retire you get some cash back. You can call that “Medicare” if you want, I guess, but it no longer provides either kind of insurance that Medicare currently provides, so Ryan’s claim to “save Medicare” is, um, a bit of a stretch. But you knew that already.


Is it rationing? Yes, in the vague sense that more people will be getting less of what they want. But the mechanism by which this happens is the same one that already operates in the individual market for people under 65: if you don’t have enough money, or you’re too sick, you just can’t buy health insurance, so you get less health care. If you call that rationing, then the Ryan Plan is just more rationing.


The more relevant question is whether the Ryan Plan will promote the more efficient allocation of health care. You can dredge up a theoretical argument that it would. In free market fantasy land, remember, employers and individuals will shop around for the most efficient health care plans, so insurers have an incentive to make their plans more efficient. The crux of the argument is that since insurers face a competitive market, they will work hard to make their plans as efficient as possible, which means they should do a better job than Medicare, which doesn’t face competition. I’m sure this argument has been advanced a hundred times by Heritage, AEI, and so on.


The problem with that argument is that it’s completely false in practice. If that market worked, then we would have a functioning health insurance market for people under 65 (where there is no Medicare);*** but if we had that, then we would not be talking about health care today.


So yes, the national challenge is spending less on health care in the future, whether or not you call it rationing. The Ryan Plan does it by eliminating Medicare (for all practical purposes) and leaving seniors to depend on their private savings and deliberately underfunded vouchers. IPAB does it by doing what the free market is supposed to do, but doesn’t. IPAB is not a complete solution, and the biggest criticism one can level at the Obama administration is that its enacted and proposed solutions aren’t enough to close the long-term Medicare deficit. (My solution is to increase Medicare payroll taxes to account for the fact that Medicare is becoming more valuable today to future beneficiaries.) But IPAB at least tries to improve Medicare and solve the cost problem. Paul Ryan simply wants to toss the elderly into the same toxic pool that tens of millions of the non-elderly are already drowning in.


* But it isn’t because individuals don’t bear enough of the marginal cost of their health care choices. All insurance markets — life insurance, auto insurance, home insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, commercial liability insurance, etc. — work by shielding people from a large portion of the consequences of their decisions. Yet competition can still work. Besides, as Paul Krugman points out, other industrialized countries have even less “consumer choice” than we do, and they all have lower costs.


** If you do call it a bad form of rationing, then I would argue that free markets are bad because they ration food, shelter, and, for that matter, all consumption goods, unfairly denying poor people of them.


*** You can’t blame all the problems with our health care system on the tax exclusion for employer-provided health care. Yes, it’s a bad thing, but it can’t arithmetically be responsible for health care costs that are twice as high as the rest of the developed world.






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“The Elderly” for Beginners

By James Kwak


As the AARP says that it is open to modest cuts in Social Security benefits, it’s worthwhile asking a more fundamental question: are Social Security and Medicare programs that benefit the elderly?


The answer may seem obvious. After all, the bulk of Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits go to people over 62, and almost all Medicare beneficiaries are over 65. So it’s often observed in passing that our long-range budget issues are the product of transfers to the elderly. For example, in Restoring Fiscal Sanity 2005, Alice Rivlin and Isabel Sawhill write, “These big programs, which benefit primarily the elderly, will drive increases in federal spending in the longer run” (p. 36). Other commentators have occasionally argued that the problem is that the elderly have become too powerful and therefore claim too large a share of government spending, especially compared to the very young.* When you add to that the frequent complaint that, by running budget deficits, we are imposing burdens on our grandchildren, this age-based inequity seems even greater.


But the problem with this framing is that “the elderly” change every year. There’s nothing inherently wrong or unfair with a program in which you pay insurance premiums while you work and collect benefits when you retire. Saying such a program benefits the elderly is like saying that life insurance doesn’t benefit the insured, only the beneficiaries: it’s true in a trivial sense, but people still want and buy life insurance anyway.


The more interesting question for any program in which you make contributions during your working years and collect benefits in retirement is whether it’s good for participants over their entire lifetimes. Currently, the Social Security payroll tax is 12.4 percent** of wage earnings up to $106,800 (that number is indexed). The benefit formula is progressive, so the more you pay in payroll taxes, the more you get back in absolute dollars, but your marginal benefit per dollar contributed declines. For middle-quintile earners born around 1975 and retiring around 1940, Social Security benefits will be about 55 percent of their immediate preretirement earnings*** (see Table 7 in this paper by Andrew Biggs and Glenn Springstead). For low earners, the replacement rate will be about 91 percent; for high earners, it will be about 38 percent.


So the real question is whether you would pay 12.4 percent of your wages for roughly 40-45 years in order to get back that distribution of replacement rates for about 20-25 years.**** There are a few different ways to think about this.


In aggregate, it is true in some sense that the people in the workforce today, plus all the people who will join the workforce in the future, will be net losers in Social Security. This is true because the first generations of beneficiaries were net winners; they received benefits that could not have been funded by their contributions. But that doesn’t mean that the median earner is worse off with Social Security. Most obviously, there is no way to replicate Social Security for yourself. You can’t find an insurance company that will sell you an annuity on Social Security’s terms in exchange for 12.4 percent of lifetime earnings, and that’s not just because Social Security exists. No insurance company could afford to offer such a product without mandatory participation, because of adverse selection; and if any insurance company does offer you such a product, you shouldn’t believe that they will still be around when it comes time to collect your benefits.


More importantly, you don’t know at age 21 whether you will be a low earner, a median earner, or a high earner, although you may have some idea. The progressive benefit formula gives you insurance against your career not working out as well as you might have hoped. Sure, if you’re a 45-year-old corporate executive making half a million dollars a year, you will be a net loser from Social Security, but that’s not the question; you can’t decide whether to buy insurance after you find out if the insurable event occurs. There are certainly some people who would opt out at age 21 if they could — notably, the scions of the rich, who don’t need old age insurance — but rationally speaking, it’s not just the people with below-median earnings potential who benefit from the existence of Social Security, it’s also a lot of the people with above-median earnings potential.


Of course, this analysis is predicated on the assumption that Social Security benefits will be there when your retire. If not, then Social Security is definitely a program that benefits the current elderly. And here it is necessary to point out that Social Security is projected to run a deficit starting around 2018.


But the key point here is that the deficit is not really that big. The 75-year deficit is equivalent to 2.22 percent of taxable payroll, which means that the program could be brought into balance through 2085 by increasing payroll taxes by 2.22 percentage points — from 12.4 percent to 14.6 percent. Alternatively, balance could be roughly achieved by eliminating the cap on earnings subject to the payroll tax and counted by the benefit formula.*****


But even without eliminating the cap on earnings, the question is: are Social Security benefits worth a 14.6 percent payroll tax? I think the answer is yes: (a) for median earners, because of the ability to use premiums during working years to pay for insurance against living too long; (b) for most people at age 21, because of the insurance against not making much money; and (c) for everyone behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. You might have a different answer to that question. But that’s the question: not whether we can afford to maintain benefits for “the elderly.”


(Medicare is the same issue, plus uncertainty about health care cost inflation. Because of the additional risk, the value of insurance is even higher.)


* Poverty among the elderly was an important historical factor behind the creation of both Social Security and Medicare. Since then, the programs have done a pretty good job of reducing old-age poverty, although they have by no means eliminated it.


** Actually, it’s 10.4 percent, but only for this year and next year, because of the December 2010 tax cut.


*** Average earnings over the five preretirement years. The full retirement age will be 67 by then under current law, so you can get slightly higher benefits by working for two more years.


**** Life expectancy at age 65 is currently around 19 years (see Table 22 in this CDC report), and will only be higher in 2040.


***** Today, only 83 percent of wages are subject to the payroll tax, so eliminating the cap would increase the tax base by over 20 percent — equivalent to a 2.5 percentage point increase in the payroll tax rate. However, increasing the cap would also increase future benefit payouts, although by much less because of the progressivity of the benefit formula.






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